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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~AY TANNER AND EDGAR L. 
VANCE for themselves and as a 
ilass action on behalf of all persons 
)imilarly situated, 
Plaintiff-Appellants 
vs. 
1NTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, aka UTAH 
roULTRY AND FARMERS CO-
~PERATIVE, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10306 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Alleged class and individual action against de-
iendant agricultural co-operative association. Eight 
i~nglomerate "Causes of Action," all of which in-
torporate each other, variously pray for accounting 
io de~nnine ownership interests, redetermination 
and reallocation over the years of net profits or 
'·margins," determination of the reasonableness of 
~serves and requirement to issue "Certificates of 
Interest" relating thereto, redetermination of 
amounts due to producers who have ceased to pro-
foce products, restraint from further distribution 
u[ Certificates of Interest and patronage credits or 
rooemption thereof, liquidation of the business and 
2 
assets of the defendant co-operative, attorneys' f 
and other relief. The relief sought would requ~:: 
fundamental reconstruction of past distribution 
the accounting procedure, and basic changes in ths, 
entire method of doing business going back ove~ 
the some forty-two years of defendant co-operative's 
existence, and the two plaintiffs purport to represent 
the interests of the thousands of defendant's patrons, 
producers and members over that unlimited time 
period. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The district court, after argument on special 
setting for the third time, granted with prejudice 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's designated 
"Second Amended Complaint" on the several 
grounds and in all particulars set forth in defend-
ant's said Motion to Dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
order dismissing the "Second Amended Complaint" 
with prejudice, both as to the individually named 
plaintiffs and as to the "class" action aspect thereof. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is necessary to correct some misleading state· 
ments set forth in Appellants' Brief, and to a~d 
certain facts and matters from the Record. To begrn 
with two additional items inadvertently omitted by 
the Clerk of the lower court have been added a?d 
certified to this Record. These are the original min· 
3 
Jte entry dated March 20, 1964, dismissing plain-
nffs' Complaint, (now R317) referred to as merely 
an"alleged" minute entry (Appellants' Brief, p.17), 
and the certified copy of Articles of Incorporation 
and other corporate documents of the defendant In-
termountain Farmers Association which was sub-
1 mitted to the trial court, (now R318-403). 
! The defendant company was organized in 1923 
as an agricultural co-operative association pursuant 
to the Utah Statute (Utah Code Ann. 1953, 3-1-1 
it seq). Over a decade ago, plaintiff Tanner did 
~usiness with and patronized the defendant, then 
mown as Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative. The 
plaintiff Tanner presented a full range of grievances 
~gainst the defendant in "an inordinantly protracted 
:1fal" in 1962 which resulted in a judgment of dis-
missal on the merits, affirmed by this Court on 
.1~peal (Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop., 
l~ U2d 145, 389 P2d 62 ( 1963)). The lower court's 
findings and Conclusions in that case are included 
rr1this Record (R46-59). Plaintiff Tanner now pur-
iorts to sue personally and to represent others in a 
ddass" action as to at least some of the matters and 
thlngs adversely decided against him in the prior 
litigation. Tanner hasn't done business with the 
Mendant co-operative since 1955 (R255), and 
~either the plaintiff Tanner nor the plaintiff Vance 
~ve been "members" or "producers" or done busi-
iess with the co-operative since before the previous 
1anner litigation in 1962 (R300). 
The present action generally has to do with 
~lleged property interests in the physical assets, 
4 
Certificates of Interest or other patronage cred'l · 
and alleg~d "unrea~or:able" reserves of the defend~~i 
co-operative associat10n. In the determination of 
some of these matters, it is important to ascertain 
whether persons claiming property interests are 
qualified "members" of the Association. Membership 
each year is based upon patronage, and such mem. 
bershi p will vary from year to year depending upon 
whether or not the required business or patronage 
is maintained. ( R382-Article X). Thus, going back 
to the inception of the co-operative in 1923, a dif. 
ferent "class" of persons constitutes the membership 
of the association each year. Particular rights and 
benefits are granted to those who currently use the 
Association's facilities (R382-Article XI and Ar-
ticle XIV). Property interests in the physical assets 
or residue thereof upon dissolution are restricted to 
"members" of the Association (R382-Article XIII 
and Article XIV; cf R236, and see contrary assertion 
with respect to this matter contained in Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 2 and 3) ; patronage credits are issued to 
both "members" and "patrons", but these are re-
deemable only upon a determination by the Board of 
Directors of the Association that the company is in 
a financial position to "revolve" or redeem such 
patronage credits (R382-Article XI). Reasonable 
reserves are permitted to be maintained (R382-
Article XII), and Mr. Tanner has already unsucces.s· 
fully litigated the matter of a purported interest rn 
such reserves by claiming that there had been. ac· 
cumulated unreasonable reserves in the prior litiga· 
5 
tion. This matter is considered in more detail under 
the heading of Res Judicata. 
, In the present litigation, plaintiffs Tanner and 
I I Vance have not and apparently cannot in repeated 
I 
attempts allege a legal interest or standing sufficient 
to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
\ 111 addition to failing to set forth a claim for relief, 
I all three versions (plus two additional amendments) 
of plaintiffs' Complaint failed to set forth "simple, 
concise and direct" allegations, and have been vague, 
indefinite and redundant in violation of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and directions of the Court 
I reimitting amendment to correct defects. 
The original Complaint (Rl-9) was filed on 
,January 29, 1964 with six persons as named plain-
tiffs. By "Amended Complaint" (RIO), one of the 
rlaintiff s was deleted, and by "Notice of Dismissal" 
three more of the original plaintiffs dismissed the 
irtion as to themselves ( R12). Motions to Dismiss 
IR20-22) and for More Definite Statement (R14-
rn) were argued before the court on March 20, 1964 
IR151-152), and an order of dismissal was entered 
as a minute entry by Judge Stewart M. Hanson as 
follows: 
"Defendants Motion to Dismiss granted and 
the plaintiff is given to May 1, 1964 to amend 
and it is suggested that in preparing the 
amended complaint that plaintiff follow Mo-
tion for More Definite Statement." (R317) 
An "Amended Complaint" was filed on May 18, 
rn64 (R27-38). While this cured the fatally incon-
6 
sistent approach of the initial complaint which 
combined a stockholders derivative action with a 
class action, by abandonment of the stockholders 
derivative aspect thereof, the allegations otherwise 
were very similar to the allegations of the original 
Complaint as well as the allegations carried through 
into the subsequent "Second Amended Complaint." 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (R42-45) on 
several grounds, including failure to set forth a legal 
interest or standing to sue. Once more an alternative 
Motion for More Definite Statement was filed (R61-
65) pointing out the substantial impossibility of 
framing a responsive pleading to the indefinite alle-
gations which had omitted reference to the nature 
of any alleged interest in the plaintiffs, the time of 
the existence thereof, and other essential matters. 
These motions were again argued fully before Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson who again entered an order of 
dismissal (R76) and filed a Memorandum Decision 
dated July 7, 1964 (R78). The Memorandum Deci· 
sion stated in part: 
"The matter was fully argued and ~ubn:itted, 
and the Court now being fully advised. m ~he 
premises finds that the motion to d1sm1ss, 
pursuant to Ground 1 of said motion, sh~uld 
be granted, and the plaintiffs given sue~ time 
as they desire to amend, if they desire to 
amend." (R78). 
(Ground 1 of the Motion to Dismiss referred to in 
f ·1 to "spec· the Memorandum Decision was for a1 ure 
ify any interest or grounds upon which the plaintiffs 
7 
oreither of them has a legal interest or standing to 
~ue the defendant in this action.") ( R42). 
Argument concerning the failure of plaintiffs 
to assert a legal standing or interest was not aimed 
"primarily" at the failure to include matter in the 
introductory paragraph within the body of the alle-
[ations of the Complaint, as is asserted in Appel-
lants' Brief (p. 6). It was made very clear in argu-
ment that the objection was and is fundamental and 
1nat nothing, even in the gratuitous opening para-
~raph, indicates the nature of any alleged interest 
in the plaintiffs. (R196; cf R289). Contrary to the 
aosolutely incorrect suggestion in Appellants' Brief 
Ip. 7) that Judge Hanson's ruling (R78) precluded 
further attack of the complaint by "similar prior 
motions," Judge Hanson made it very clear in vacat-
ing plaintiffs' ex parte order which attempted to 
mlarge upon his Memorandum Decision and ruling 
(R79-80) that the ruling would speak for itself and 
i·ould stand as originally written (R81, 82; cf R83, 
!4). 
The "Second Amended Complaint," which is the 
wmplaint now before the Court, wasn't filed until 
ieptember 1, 1964 (R87-99). This actually consti-
tuted the fourth change or amendment since the 
original Complaint was filed January 29, 1964. Not-
rithstanding having taken the generous leave 
iranted by the Court to amend in order to recast the 
rleading so as to show, if possible, a sufficient legal 
mterest or standing, the "Second Amended Com-
~laint" was a virtual verbatum copy of the previous 
8 
defective "Amended Complaint." The only dist' 
tion is that the introductory paragraph as previo mr 
set forth in the Amended Complaint was si;? 
repeated in the bo~y of the allegations of the Sectn~ 
Amended Complamt. (Compare R27 with R87, 88· 
cf R213). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint (Rlll-131), argued on a spe-
cial setting basis ( R135, 136), was granted with 
prejudice as to all grounds and particulars thereof 
(R137, 138). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was dis-
missed with prejudice pursuant to motion authorized 
under Rule 12 (b) ( 6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted," and in accordance with other 
applicable Rules including Rules 8(a), 8(e), and 
41 (b). Comments in Appellants' Brief relative to 
demurrers under Rule 7 ( c) (Appellants' Brief p. 8), 
raising affirmative defenses in pleadings under Rule 
8(c) (Appellants' Brief p. 10), and capacity (not 
interest or standing) to sue under Rule 9(a) (1) 
(Appellants' Brief p. 10) are clearly inapplicable. 
It is submitted that an affirmative plead,ing is not 
required under the Rules in order to attack a com· 
9 
ulaint on the ground of an insufficiency of interest 
;,r standing to sue. 
It should be noted that Defendant's Motion to 
Jismiss the Second Amended Complaint was granted 
"in all particulars" (Rl38). There were several 
~·ounds for dismissal asserted in said motion, any 
of which will support affirmance of the trial court's 
action. In this connection, this Court stated in 
Waters vs. Waters, 100 Utah 246, 248, 113 P2d 1038 
(1941) : 
"Neither the order of the court sustaining the 
demurrer nor that of dismissal indicates upon 
which of several grounds thereof the demurrer 
was sustained. It, therefore, becomes neces-
sary to examine the petition in the light of 
both the general and special objections to its 
sufficience, since the ruling of the lower court 
will be upheld if it properly sustained the de-
rnurrer on any of such grounds, the presump-
tion being that it ruled upon that ground." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, this Court stated in Burningham v. 
~urke et al, 67 Utah 90, 100, 245 P 977 (1926): 
"Though the court erred in granting the mo-
tion (for nonsuit) on the particular ground 
on which it was granted, still, if it ought to 
have been granted on one or more of the other 
grounds stated in the motion, the ruling 
nevertheless must be upheld." 
Another proposition of law of importance rela-
1ive to this matter is the oft recognized concept that 
~ranting or refusing to grant permission to file 
10 
repeated amendments is within the sound discret' 
of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision of a ti~o~ 
judge with regard to such matters should not~ 
overturned unless there is shown an abuse of discre~ 
tion. Thus in Shall v. Henry, 211 F2d 226 (CA 7 
1954), the court upheld a refusal to permit amend'. 
ment after repeated unsuccessful attempts to state 
a claim, and said: 
"In view of the many amendments to the 
complaint permitted by the court and the 
voluminous pleadings filed as a result even 
though the right to amend is to be con~trued 
liberally, we think the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying ... application to amend 
still further. There must be an end sometime 
to applications to amend. Plaintiff had five 
chances to state his case. Under the circum· 
stances disclosed by the record, there was no 
abuse of discretion in this respect." 211 F2d 
at 231. 
A. COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DIS-
MISSED FOR FAIL URE TO SET FORTH 
A LEGAL INTEREST OR STANDING 
TO SUE 
Rule 8 (a) requires that a claim be set fo:th 
" ... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
... " (Emphasis added). In the case before the 
court, plaintiffs set forth three times "Causes ~f 
Action" which did not allege any legal interest m 
d. of themselves to sue the defendant. A close rea mg 
the Second Amended Complaint fails to show, wheth-
er in the introductory paragraph or in paragraph 
11 
1 of the alleged First Cause of Action, or elsewhere, 
a legal interest or standing in the named plaintiffs 
to sue. This is contrary to the fundamental proposi-
tion of law that where a property interest or owner-
ship in the subject matter of the action is sought, 
the pleader must set forth his alleged interest : 
"Obviously where the right of the plaintiff to 
recover depends on his ownership, title, pos-
session, or right of possession of the subject 
matter of the action, there must be in his 
declaration or complaint a sufficiently full 
and particular averment thereof . . . . 
"A plaintiff must allege the performance or 
fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon 
which his right of action depends, or show 
sufficient legal excuse for failure or non-
performance, or a waiver thereof ... " 41 
Am Jur., Pleadings, Section 89, page 353. 
(Emphasis added) 
In the case of Heathman vs. Hatch, 13 U2d 
i66, 268, 372 P2d 990 (1962), this court observed 
that: 
"The objective of these rules is to require that 
the essential facts upon which redress is 
sought be set forth with simplicity, brevity, 
clarity and certainty so that it can be deter-
mined whether there exists a legal basis for 
the relief claimed; and if so, so that there will 
be a clearly defined foundation upon which 
further proceedings by way of responsive 
pleadings and/ or trial can go forward in an 
orderly manner." (Emphasis added) 
In State vs. California Packing Corporation 
105 Utah 182, 141 P2d 386 ( 1943), this court re-
12 
jected as defective an amended complaint h' h 
failed to show facts indicating a right to sue :w ic 
"D~ such allegat~ons state a cause of action? 
As is so ~ften said, to state a ca~se of actio~ 
a ~oI?pl~mt mus~ s~ow: A primary right 
existing in the plaintiff; a primary duty with 
regard thereto imposed by law on the defend-
ant; a dehct ?Y. d~fen?ant in his duty with 
respect to plamtiff s right ... The amended 
complaint fails to show or plead any facts 
sustaining a necessary inf ere nee to show that 
plaintiff had a primary right to have the 
waters of Mill Race Ditch unpolluted; it also 
fails to show any duty owed by defendant to 
plaintiff with respect to the waters of Mill 
Race Ditch, or that defendant did anythingit 
did not have a right to do." 105 Utah at 185, 
189. (Emphasis added) 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that it is not abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to dismiss a complaint with prejudice where 
it appears that no amendment could cure the defect 
in question. Accordingly, an order granting a Rule 
12 (b) ( 6) motion with prejudice was upheld as with-
in the trial court's discretion. Feinberg vs. Leach 
243 F2d 64 ( CA5, 1957). In that case, the court 
regarded as one of the evidences of the appar~nt 
incurability of the complaint the fact that the plam· 
tiff had attempted by three different complaints to 
state a claim and failed. 
A striking case of importance both as t? t~e 
individual and class aspects of the present act10n '.s 
Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
I 13 
I co., 43 F Supp 735 (ND Iowa 1942), modified, 133 
l F2d 101 (CA 8, 1942), remanded, 51 F Supp 440 (!943). In that case, the plaintiff co-operative asso-
ciation brought a class action alleging conspiracy 
under the Clayton Act in the control of prices of 
gasoline in a certain area. The alleged conspiracy 
was asserted to have caused the plaintiff association 
to raise the price of gasoline to its members by 214 
cents per gallon. The trial court granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, holding that the case was not a 
proper class suit and that the real parties in interest 
~'ere the members of the co-operative and not the 
co·operative itself. (43 F Supp 735). The Court of 
Appeals affirmed that ruling, but held that the trial 
court should have permitted the plaintiff to amend 
and show any cause of action pertaining to itself as 
acorporate entity. (133 F2d 101). Accordingly, 
rlaintiff, on remand, amended its original Com-
11laint and claimed all of the damages to itself. The 
trial court dismissed that complaint also, but granted 
leave to file an amended pleading, which would set 
forth specifically and factually its damages, as dis-
1 tlnguished from the damages of its members. Once 
again plaintiff amended its complaint, whereupon 
the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The court 
said: 
I 
"I conclude that defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss is well taken upon either ground: First, 
that the pleading does not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, because the 
damage complained of is entirely conjectural 
and impossible of proof ... Second, it was 
14 
finally determined on the first appeal h 
were the real parties in interest . w 0 
"I conclude that the motion must be. ~ustain d 
upon eac.h .of the gro~n~s interposed, and\ 
am of op1:i~on that plamtiff having had three 
opportunities to state a cause of action and 
failed, that leniency is now exhausted and 
that the case should be dismissed and it is so 
ordered." 51 F Supp at 442' (Emphasis 
added). 
It seems clear that the trial judges in the case 
before the court regarded it as improbable that 
future amendments could cure the defect for which 
the complaints were dismissed. Thus, in the Memo-
randum Decision of Judge Hanson dismissing the 
"Amended Complaint," unlimited time was granted 
to plaintiffs to amend "if they desire to amend." 
(R78) The fatal nature of the defect was repeatedly 
argued in court, and it was stipulated by counsel for 
plaintiffs that the parties before the court claim no 
present membership interest as producers or current 
patronage interest in the defendant co-operative 
( R300). It was also candidly noted that the action 
itself was not "particularly" brought on behalf of 
the named plaintiffs but rather for the class (R227; 
cf R244). Under the state of facts in this Record, 
it was not error to dismiss the "Second Amended 
Complaint" with prejudice, since after several at· 
tempts to amend it still failed to state a claim show· 
ing that plaintiffs were entitled to relief as required 
by Rule 8 (a). 
15 
B. COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DIS-
MISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY 
WITH OTHER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND PRIOR ORDERS OF 
COURT 
Rule 41 (b) provides: 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him . . . 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Among other grounds, the Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (see R112, 
113) attacked that pleading under Rule 41 (b) for 
failure to comply with certain Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well as the court's directive that subse-
quent amendments should follow requirements set 
forth in Defendant's Motion for More Definite State-
ment. 
1. Failure to Comply with Court Order. 
Judge Hanson entered the following order in 
uismissing plaintiffs' "original" (although twice 
amended) complaint: 
"Defendants Motion to Dismiss granted and 
the plaintiff is given to May 1, 1964 to amend 
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and it is suggested that in preparing th 
amended complaint that plaintiff follow Me 
tion for More Definite Statement." (R317)°" 
A striking case similar in many respects to the 
facts of this case is Blake v. De Vilbiss Co., 118 F2d 
3~6 (CA6, 1941_). That case was an action forinju. 
r1es caused by diseases resulting from an employer's 
negligence. Some seventeen respiratory diseases and 
seven or eight organic diseases were claimed to have 
been inflicted upon the plaintiff for failure to fur. 
nish pure air to breathe and other negligent omis-
sions. The trial court regarded the petition in 
question as "not sufficiently definite or certain to 
apprise the defendant of the basis for the relief 
claimed or to permit a recovery," but permitted 
amendment on condition that such should avoid 
"prolixity and surplusage" and should state precisely 
the claims and grounds of negligence upon which 
recovery was relied. Amendments were made in due 
course but these were "equally prolix and indefinite 
not only in respect to specific diseases suffered and 
the acts of negligence complained of but also to the 
time or place of their commission and their approxi-
mate relations to the injury." A subsequent amend-
ment was subject to the same infirmities. A motion 
interposed under Rule 41 (b) was granted an~ the 
complaint was dismissed with prejudice for fa.1l~re 
to comply with the order of the court re9umng 
definite and certain allegations, as well as fa1lur~ t.0 
conform with Rule 8 ( e) of the Federal Rules of .civil 
Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the JUdg· 
men t of dismissal. 
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That a court has inherent power to order 
dismissal of an action with prejudice where amend-
ments fail to comply with the court's rules of pro-
ceedings and/ or orders is clearly affirmed in Feight 
v. Mathers et al., 153 Nebraska 839, 46 NW 2d 492. 
(1951). The rule is summarized in an annotation in 
American Law Reports: 
"It is obvious that the power and authority 
of a trial court to compel obedience to orders 
relating to the plaintiff's pleadings is neces-
sary to attain orderly and prompt disposition 
of pretrial proceedings. Recognizing this fact, 
the courts in ju:cisdictions adopting or allow-
ing dismissal of a plaintiff's action as a proper 
punishment or coercive measure have uni-
formly held or recognized that an action, in 
the discretion of the trial court, may be dis-
missed because of the disobedience of an order 
relating to pleadings filed, or to be filed, by 
the plaintiff." 4 ALR 2d 348, 352. (Emphasis 
added). 
The direction of the court to the plaintiffs in 
De Vilbiss to define their claims and grounds, thereby 
avoiding prolixity and surplusage, was, in effect, the 
same direction and suggestion made to plaintiffs in 
this case by Judge Hanson in his order of March 20, 
, 1964 (R317). Judge Hanson's order required Plain-
tiffs to follow the Motion for More Definite State-
ment, which motion pointed out in specificity the 
matters and things essential in order to enable de-
fendant to frame a responsive pleading. (R14-19; cf 
R61-65 and Rl00-104). Counsel for Appellant re-
gards Judge Hanson's directive as "no more than a 
1 
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suggestion" which "does not constitute an ord ,, I 
(Appellants' Brief p. 17), but that kind of "sug er 
t . " . . 1 h ges. ion is precise y t e sort of order which is comm 
with reference to attempts to refile in conformi~n 
with Rule 8. Thus, in Walter Reade's Theaters J ' 
Loew's Inc., 20 FRD 579 (SDNY, 1957), the follow~ 
ing "suggestion" was made: 
"Accordingly, the complaint is stricken with 
leave to plaintiff within 20 days to file an 
amended pleading which contains simple 
concise, and distinct averments in conformity 
with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The amended complaint should avoid 
the infirmities of the present complaint herein 
referred to." (20 FRD at 582). 
It seems clear that the foregoing "suggestion'' 
amounted to an "order," which if not followed would 
be subject to attack under Rule 41 (b). The directive 
or "suggestion" in De Vilbiss was certainly so re-
garded, and properly so. Judge Hanson's "sugges-
tion" should also be so regarded. 
2. Failure to Show Cause for Repeated Ament 
ments-Rule 15 (a) 
Rule 15 (a) provides in part that: 
"A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time befo~e a respon: 
sive pleading is served ... Otherwise, a party 
may amend his pleading only by leave of cou:'. 
Or by written consent Of the adverse rart,J I 
and leave shall be freely given when 1ustice 
so requires." (Emphasis added.) 
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Cases construing Rule 15 (a) where leave to file 
repeated amendments is sought are pertinent to this 
situation. Rulings in this regard are entirely discre-
' tionary, the public policy and reasoning behind re-
fusal to grant such amendments generally being 
that there must be an end to litigation at some point. 
See Shall v. Henry, 211 F2d 226 (CA7, 1954). 
A case which stands for the proposition that 
repeated amendments will not be allowed in order 
to state a cause of action when previous complaints 
have failed on that very ground is Laughlin v. Gar-
nett, 138 F2d 931 ( CADC, 1943) cert den 322 US 
738. That case was an action for malicious prosecu-
tion against two United States Attorneys and a 
police officer wherein practically all of the activities 
described in the complaint were part of the official 
duties of those officers. The trial court refused to 
permit plaintiff to file a third amended complaint 
in which knowledge of instigation of false charges 
was alleged, as was knowing preparation and presen-
tation of forged documents to a grand jury in order 
to obtain false indictments. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia upheld the trial court's 
discretion in refusing further amendment, and said: 
"Under Rule 15(a), of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, after responsive pleadings 
have been filed a party may amend only by 
written consent of the adverse party or by 
leave of court when justice so requires. Since 
the complaint before us is the fourth unsuc-
cessful attempt of appellant to set out a cause 
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of action against appellees, we believe that th 
court properly denied further amendment'~ 
138 F2d at 932 (Emphasis added). · 
It is well established that granting or denying 
prof erred amendments is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Thus, refusal to grant leave to 
amend is not ground for reversal except for abuse 
of discretion. (Frank Adam Electric Co. v. Westing-
house Electric Mfg. Co., 146 F2d 165 ( CA8, 1945). 
The inquiry in reviewing the trial court's action in 
such cases is confined to circumstances which clearly 
show an abuse of discretion, in the nature of arbi-
trary action. (Hartford-Empire v. Obear-Nester 
Glass Co. 95 F2d 414 (CA8, 1938). See also N.L.R.B. 
v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F2d 
8, 11 ( CA6, 1960) and Kirsch v. Barnes, 157 F Supp 
671 (DC 1957) aff'd 263 F2d 692 (CA9, 1959). Itis 
said that a court's ruling on whether or not to grant 
amendments after the first will be disturbed only 
upon gross abuse of its power. Heay v. Phillips, 201 
F2d 220, (CA9, 1952). 
Some considerations which may justify refusal 
to permit amendment were discussed at length in 
Friedman et al v. Trans-American Corporation, 5 
FRD 115 (DADel, 1946). In that case the court was 
confronted with a proferred amendment for the 
fourth time several months after the original com-
plaint was' filed, which amendment contained no 
essentially "new" matter. The motion to amend was 
denied, and the court said : 
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"Rule 15 (a) provides that leave to amend 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
The word "freely" was used with deliberate 
intention to obviate technical restrictions on 
amendment. Moore, Federal Practice, p. 806. 
But, this does not mean that leave to amend 
is to be granted without limit; otherwise, the 
right to amend would be absolute and not rest 
in the discretion of the court. The interests of 
both parties should be considered when an ap-
plication to amend is made. Opportunity 
should be given to a plaintiff to present his 
alleged grievance; yet equal attention should 
be given to the proposition that there must be 
an end finally to a particular litigation ... 
In short, the matter of giving leave to amend 
is one in the sound discretion of the nisi prius 
court. I agree with Judge Rif kind that "Rule 
15 (a) prescribes a liberal policy in granting 
leave to amend." But "a liberal policy" does 
not mean the absence of all restraint. Were 
that the intention, leave of court woilld not be 
required. The requirement of judicial approv-
al suggests that there are instances where 
leave should not be granted. Here, I believe 
we have such an instance. This is plaintiffs' 
fourth attempt to state their cause of action 
and their third request to amend, more than 
sixteen months after the complaint was filed." 
(5 FRD at 116. Emphasis added). 
3. Failure to File Clear and Comprehensible 
Pleading-Rule 8 ( e) 
Rule 8 ( e) requires. that averments in pleadings 
be "simple, concise, and direct." In the De Vilbiss 
case, supra, the court made specific reference to 
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the fact that the defective pleading, which was fin 1-
ly dismissed with prejudice, "does not conform ~o 
Rule 8 ~ e ). ( 1) of the federal rules." ( 118 F2d at 
347). S1m1larly, the court observed in Strahle-John-
son Supply Co., 1 FRD 279 (ED Tenn, 1940) that 
"The letter and spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires simple, concise, and direct denials, admis-
sions, and averments in pleadings." (Portion of 
answer stricken on trial court's own initiative.) It 
is clear that the determination of whether there has 
been reasonable compliance with the rules, including 
Rule 8 ( e), must rest with the trial court's discretion. 
Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F2d 
560 ( CA9, 1959), cert den 359 U.S. 980. 
In the case at bar, the pleadings on file are any-
thing but "simple, concise and direct." They are 
actually a conglomerate of averments, unlimited in 
scope as to time, persons or otherwise. They are im-
precise as to the nature of any alleged injury. A good 
example is the introductory paragraph of both the 
"amended" and "second amended" complaints, the 
inclusion of which into affirmative allegations appel-
lants rely upon as setting forth an adequately 
pleaded interest. Actually, however, the long and in-
volved sentence structure is never completed into a 
full English sentence. (See R87, 88.) Similarly, 
"various years" and "times material" are referred 
to, but no actual reference of a concise nature ap-
pears so as to enable a responsive pleading by way of 
affirmative defense or otherwise. As a result of the 
gross violations of Rule 8(e) and Rule 12(c), relat. 
uq 
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ing to immaterial and redundant matter, motions to 
strike (R23, 24; R66-68; R105-110) were filed sett-
ing forth in particularity the complained of defects 
under Rule 8 ( e). These were companion motions to 
the Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite State-
ment, and while not granted directly, contain in some 
detail the specification of defects pertinent to Rule 
S(e), the violation of which was one of the grounds 
for granting the Motion to Dismiss. 
C. THE COMPLAINT WAS RES JUDICATA 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF TANNER, 
AND THEREFORE WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED AS TO HIM. 
Despite counsel for Appellants' claim that this 
question is not properly before the court (Appellant's 
Brief p. 16) it is submitted that having attached the 
Findings and Conclusions to the Motion to Dismiss 
(R117-130) such became properly before the court in 
the nature of an affidavit or information in support 
of the motion. While Rule 8 ( c) permits raising the 
defense of res judicata in pleadings, it certainly 
doesn't preclude raising the defense by a Rule 12 (b) 
(6) Motion. In any event, this is a matter as to which 
the court can take judicial notice since it involves the 
Supreme Court of Utah's own decision in a case pre-
viously before it, embracing Findings and Conclu-
sions ref erred to therein. 
It is submitted that the entire Complaint as to 
the plaintiff Tanner should in any event be dismissed 
as res judicata. The Third Cause of Action in Plain-
tiff's Second Amended Complaint most clearly comes 
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within the d~ctri:ie~ however. To the extent that that 
cause of act10n is mcorporated in the other caus 
of action, they would very clearly also be res ju;i~ 
cata. The Third Cause of Action has to do with an 
alleged property interest of the plaintiffs in an ac-
cumulation of unreasonable reserves. The fact of the 
matter, however, is that Ray Tanner had fully pre-
sented this matter in the previous litigation and the 
court found that no reserves had been established 
which were unreasonable. Accordingly, that aspect 
of the Complaint of Mr. Tanner in the previous liti-
gation was dismissed with prejudice. See Finding No. 
6 (R121) and Conclusion No. 1 (R129) and No. 3 
(R130). This is important not only in regard to the 
propriety of a personal action as to such matters by 
Mr. Tanner, but also with respect to his representa-
tive capacity or lack of it in connection with the 
class aspect of the litigation. 
It is clear also in the previous litigation that the 
trial court ruled that the interest and standing of the 
plaintiff Tanner was such that he was guilty of 
laches, and the causes of action asserted were barred 
by the statute of limitations, and other defenses. 
(R129). 
The doctrine of res judicata is broad enough to 
embrace all matters which were expressly litigated 
as well as matters and things which could have been 
raised and adjudicated. Thus in East Mill Creek 
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 321, ~22, 
159 P2d 863 ( 1945) this court pointed out that if .a 
second case is between the same parties or their 
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privies, and the claim, demand or cause of action is 
the same in both cases, the doctrine of res judicata 
"applies not only to points and issues which are ac-
tually raised and decided therein but also to such as 
could have been therein adjudicated . .. In such case 
the courts hold that the parties should litigate their 
entire claim, demand and cause of action, and every 
part, issue and ground thereof, and if one of the 
parties fails to raise any point or issue or to litigate 
any part of his claim, demand or cause of action and 
the matter goes to final judgment, such party. may 
not again litigate that claim, demand or cause of ac-
tion or any issue, point or part thereof which he could 
have but failed to litigate in the former action." 
(Emphasis added) . 
Again, in Wheadon v. Pearson 14 U2d 45, 47, 
376 P2d 946 (1962), this Court said: 
"Policy would seem to indicate that when a 
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his en-
tire relief, based upon his entire claim, then 
the matter should be laid at rest. He should be 
denied a second attempt at substantially the 
same objective under a different guise." (Em-
phasis added) 
(See also Stillinovich v. Ottilia Villa, Inc., 14 U2d 
222, 381 P2d 210 (1963).) 
Appellants insist that the issue of res judicata 
can be raised only in a pleading under Rule 8 ( c). 
This position is contrary to what appears to be the 
weight of authority and the better reasoned cases. 
Professor Moore has summarized the rule : 
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"It should n~w ?e clear, however, that the de-
fense of res JUd1cata can be ... raised by mo 
t~on to dismiss for failure to state a clai~ 
smce the court may treat such a motion as a 
motion for summary judgment." lB Moore's 
Federal Practice 951, 952. Accord Hartmann 
v. Time, 166 F2d 127, 138 (CA3, i947). 
In Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg, 191 
F2d 877 (CA 7, 1951), the court upheld a judgment 
of res judicata based upon a Rule 12(b) (6) motion 
in which prior court findings and conclusions were 
referred to. 
Counsel for appellants assert that no claim of 
plaintiff Tanner is res judicata, but concede that the 
issue could well apply to the reasonableness of re-
serves (Third Ca use of Action) , if such were prop-
erly raised in an affirmative pleading. (Appellant's 
Brief p. 16). At the same time, comfort is taken in 
the assertion that the question of reallocation of 
"margins" wasn't expressly presented in the prior 
litigation. It is submitted that based upon the pre-
vious ruling in which plaintiff 'Tanner was held to 
have no valid claim of any kind against the defendant 
co-operative, all of his claims being dismissed with 
prejudice (Rl30), coupled with the doctrine that 
any other claims he conceivably could assert should 
then have been raised and litigated, the entire action 
should be dismissed with prejudice in any event 
against the plaintiff Tanner. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED AS TO THE CLASS ACTION 
It is fundamental that the "class" aspect of the 
present action must fall if the individual action 
fails. The reason for this, of course, is that if the in-
dividual plaintiffs do not possess rights or interests 
sufficient to maintain this action for themselves, 
they most certainly do not possess additional rights 
by some magic in order to maintain a "class" suit. 
Thus, in Pacific Inter-Club Yacht Assn. vs. Morris, 
197 FSupp 218 (ND Calif, 1960), 288 F2d 886 (CA 
9, 1961), it was held that where no individual would 
have standing to enjoin the creation of a bridge with-
out a showing of special damage to himself, the mere 
fact that the suit was brought under Rule 23 in the 
name of 9,000 individuals who might seek to use the 
waterway over which the bridge was to be built could 
not create greater rights in the group than a single 
individual would have. 
In the case at bar, it appears that plaintiffs hope 
to "pull themselves up by their boot straps" and 
bolster their faltering individual interest and stand-
ing by asserting through counsel that the action was 
not "particularly" brought for those plaintiffs, but 
rather for the "class" ( R 227). This appears to be 
a spurious argument. 
A. No Common "Class" is Defined or De-
lineated. 
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Rule 23 (a) permits a representative action 0 
behalf of " ... persons constituting a class . ... '' n 
The immediate problem is, what persons consti. 
tute the "class" which plaintiffs claim to represent? 
As pointed out in the recitation of facts herein the 
Articles of Incorporation of the defendant co-o~era. 
tive association contemplate that membership in the 
association shall be based upon patronage with the 
association each year, and such membership varies 
from year to year depending upon whether or not a 
minimum amount of business or patronage is main-
tained (currently $500.00 per annum. See R 382-
Article X). In fact, there is a different "class" of 
persons having an interest in the "margins", re-
serves, and other assets of the association from year 
to year, depending upon patronage. It is also a fact 
that the defendant co-operative association has been 
divided into distinct and separate departments, each 
of which constitutes a separate "class" of persons. 
These departments serve both purchasing (Farm 
Supply, Feed Sales and Processing, and Fertilizer 
Sales) and marketing (Egg Processing and Sales, 
Poultry and Turkey Processing) functions of the 
co-operative. Since in any year a profit may be 
realized in one or more of the departments, while a 
loss may be sustained in other departments, ~he 
patrons of the "profit" departments may have m-
terests adverse to or inconsistent with the patrons of 
"loss" departments in the matter of allocation of the 
net "margins". Plaintiffs demand a re-allocation. of 
past patronage refunds based upon an interpretatrnn 
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which would in effect lump the "profit" departments 
1dth the "loss" departments, thereby spreading the 
''margins" without reference to the department-
alized source of the creation of such "margins". (R 
273). This is incompatible with the manner and 
method of accounting and allocation carried on by 
the association in the past, and would unquestion-
ably prejudice the many members and patrons to 
whom have been allocated certificates of interest and 
other patronage credits on a departmentalization 
basis. 
The complaint in this action fails to identify or 
describe a common "class" of persons purportedly 
represented herein, except by lumping the "tens of 
thousands" (R 287) of patrons and members since 
inception of the co-operative as the "only one class" 
who own some sort of "undivided interest" in the 
"mass of assets" over the years. (Appellants' Brief 
p.14; cf pp. 4, 5). In seeking to require a re-alloca-
tion of past patronage refunds, plaintiffs herein 
lump together all members and patrons without ref-
erence to source of business and patronage, which 
has the effect of putting into one conglomerate mass 
incompatible and antagonistic interests. As a result, 
there is nowhere set forth a "class" within the mean-
ing of Rule 23. 
The assertion of the existence of a "class" 
doesn't create one: 
"By definition, an essential prerequisite to a 
class action is the existence of a "class" . .. An 
action, of course, is not a class suit merely be-
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cause it is designated as such in the pleadin . ~hether it is or is not depends upon the atte~~ 
~nr; /a~ts. But the compl~int, or other pleadin 
1n1.tiating the class act10n, should allege th~ 
existence of the necessary facts, i.e., the exU!t-
ence of a class, .. . " 3 Moore's Federal Practice 
3423, 3424. (Emphasis added.) 
It is well established that the interests of per-
sons purportedly representing a "class" must be 
compatible with and not antagonistic to the interests 
of the "class" represented (Hansberry vs. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32 ( 1940) ) . A fortiori, where a conglomerate 
of several categories of persons, some categories of 
which have interests not wholly compatible with or 
antagonistic to the interests of the others, are lumped 
together. 
B. Plaintiffs Do Not Belong to the "Class". 
Rule 23, in authorizing class suits, permits the 
action to be brought only by "such of them", refer-
ring to "persons constituting a class." Plaintiffs 
must belong to the "class" they claim to represent, 
and their interest and right as such members of the 
class must be pleaded. See Clark vs. Chase National 
Bank, 45 FSupp 820 (SDNY, 1942) and Ricky vs. 
Illinois Central R. R., 278 F2d 529 (CA 7, 1960). 
This Court has recognized that Rule 23 requires the 
persons who are suing on behalf of the class to belong 
to the class. Thus, in Salt Lake City vs. Utah Lake 
Farmers Association, 4 U2d 14, 25, 286 P2d 773 
(1955), Justice Wade observed that "Rule 23 only 
authorizes the defendants to represent a class of per· 
sons to which they belong . ... "Professor Moore cites 
i 
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many authorities for the proposition that" ... the in-
terest of the named representative ... must be co-
extensive with the interest of the other members of 
the class." 3 Moore's Federal Procedure 3427. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs are not current 
''members" of the defendant co-operative associa-
tion, and neither have belonged or done business with 
the association since before 1962 (R 300). (In the 
case of Plaintiff Tanner, not since 1955 (R 255). 
These plaintiffs do not have a co-extensiveness of 
interest with current members and patrons. Also 
their interest cannot be the same as the class of per-
sons who allegedly benefited from the past allocations 
or patronage refunds. (See paragraph 1 of Plain-
tiffs' Second Amended Complaint. R 91.) It is clear 
that plaintiffs seek to recalculate past allocations, 
without regard to source of patronage by depart-
ments ( R. 273). Their interests would certainly be 
incompatible and not co-extensive with the interests 
of the persons to whom patronage refunds have been 
allocated, and from whom plaintiffs would ap-
parently seek to take such allocations away. 
, It is submitted that the plaintiffs have an an-
• tagonistic interest with many past patrons and mem-
, bers and could not belong to the same "class". By 
, reason of that fact alone, this action cannot be main-
: tained by these plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of the 
1 United States has set forth the guidelines thusly: 
I 
I "It is one thing to say that some members of a 
class may represent other members in a litiga-
tion where the sole and common interest of the 
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class ii: the litigation, is either to assert a com 
n:on rig~~ or to challenge an asserted obli · · 
bon. ( C1tmg cases). It is quite another t hgf. t~at all those ;vho are free alterna~iv~ld 
either. to assert rights or to challenge them ai·~ 
of a s1!1gie class, so that any group merely be. 
cause it is of the class so constituted may b 
deemed a?eq?~telJ: to rep:e~ent any ~thers 0~ 
the class m htigatmg their mterests in eithe· 
alternative. Such a selection of representative~ 
for the purpose of litigation, whose substantfol 
interests are not necessarily or even probably 
the same as those whom they are deerned 
to represent, does not afford that protection to 
absent parties which due process required." 
Hansberry vs. Lee, 311 U.S. at 44, 45. (Em-
phasis added.) 
C. Plaintiffs Do Not Adequately Represent 
Any "Class". 
Rule 23 permits class actions to be brought only 
by such persons who constitute the class " ... as will 
fairly insure the adequate representation of all. ... " 
This matter was extensively dealt with in Salt Lake 
City vs. Utah Lake Farmers Association, 4 U2d 14, 
286 P2d 773 ( 1955). In that case, this Court observed 
the distinctions under the rule between "true", "hy-
brid" and "spurious" class actions, and it was ob-
served that as to each type of action the rule requires 
joinder of such persons as ". . . will fairly insme 
adequate representation of all members of the class." 
The considerations and factors with reference to a 
determination of adequacy of representation are dis-
cussed by Professor Moore as follows: 
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"In determining the question the court must 
consider ( 1) whether the interest of the named 
party is co-extensive with the interests of the 
other members of the class; (2) whether his 
interests are antagonistic in any way to the in-
terests of those whom he represents; ( 3) the 
?Jroportion of those made parties as compared 
with the total membership of the class; ( 4) 
any other factors bearing on the ability of the 
named party to speak for the rest of the class; 
and ( 5) the type of class action involved-
whether true, hybrid, or spurious." 3 Moore's 
Federal Practice 3425. (Emphasis added.) 
It seems clear that under any of the factors 
' above refc1Ted to in judging adequacy of representa-
tion that the plaintiffs in this case fall far short of 
the mark. The1·e is serious problem with regard to 
co.extensiveness of interest, since neither of the 
plaintiffs are current patrons or members and ap-
pear to claim rights different from those of patrons 
of some of the co-operative's departments; there is 
probable antagonism bet\veen the interests of these 
plaintiffs and the interests of many of the other pro-
focers they have conglomerated into the "class"; the 
proportion of representation based upon the "tens of 
1housands" of persons (R287) plaintiffs purport to 
i'epresent would be de minimus. There are other 
serious factors adversely bearing upon the "ability of 
the named plaintiffs to speak for the rest of the 
. class'', particularly the res judicata matter relating 
I to the Plaintiff Tanner. 
I An additional very serious matter bearing upon I tlli; propriety of representation here is the type of 
I 
I 
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class action involved. Counsel for appellants rega d 
this suit as in the nature of a "true" or "hyb;d;; 
class action, and extensively so argued it (R228· 
R277). If this action is of the "true" variety it 
would be absolutely binding upon all persons within 
the class and hence adequate representation would be 
extremely important: 
"The question of adequate representation is 
very important in the true class suit, for there 
as we shall see, a judgment on the merits bind~ 
all the members of the class and adequate 
representation is essential to due process of 
law." 3 Moore's Federal Practice 3425. 
While the "hybrid" suit is not technically bind-
ing upon all class members, adequacy of representa-
tion is nevertheless an important issue: 
" ... a court has a duty to see that its processes 
are not abused, that the action is not a mere 
collection device to promote the plaintiff's in-
dividual interests, ... To this extent the court 
may properly scrutinize the plaintiff's claim 
of representation." 3 Moore's Federal Practice 
3426. 
The "spurious" class action is really a mere per-
missive joinder device, no one being bound except the 
original plaintiffs and interveners. The matter of 
basic propriety and desirableness of such joinde.r, ~s 
is the case in all "class" actions, is of course within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court 
has clearly pointed out the reasons why individual 
damage claims, and other claims of an individual na· 
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ture, are inappropriate for disposition under the 
''spurious" class action : 
"The individual damage claims of the mem-
bers of this class are several and not common 
claims as are their claims for violation of their 
rights and for injunctive relief previously con-
sidered. They are spurious not true repre-
sentation claims and come under subdivision 
(a) (3) and not (a) (1), of Rule 23 ... Such 
individual damage claims cannot be litigated 
by representation, they can only be litigated if 
the claimant is or becomes a party to this 
action, for such claims are dependent on in-
dividual factors not common to all members of 
the class and the defendants simply do not rep-
resent the other members of the class as to 
such individual claims." Salt Lake City vs. 
Utah Lake Farmers, 4 U2d at 25, 26. (Em-
phasis added.) 
. It is difficult to assign the designation of "true", 
! "hybrid" or "spurious" to the kind of "class" action 
presented herein. It is believed that this action is 
fundamentally not a class action at all, and so the 
; problem of designation of the variety of such action 
is not reached. However, it is submitted that by any 
; of the designations that might be assigned to this 
: action as a "class" action its maintenance would be 
, inappropriate on the ground of inadequacy of repre-
, sentation. It should be remembered that this action 
1 was commenced with several plaintiffs (Rl-9). By 
"Amended Complaint" (RIO) one of the plaintiffs 
' was deleted, and subsequently by "Notice of Dis-
! missal" ( Rl2) three more of the plaintiffs were 
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dismissed out of the action. This has left only plain. 
tiffs Tanner and Vance purporting to represent t}
1 " . e tens of thousands" (R287) of the patrons who have 
an alleged interest in this lawsuit. It seems clear 
that these plaintiffs do not adequately represent any 
"class". 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court's judgment 
of dismissal with prejudice should be affirmed both 
as to the individual plaintiffs and with regard to the 
so-called "class" aspect of the complaint. 
With regard to the individual plaintiffs, it is 
significant that in the three separate versions of 
complaints (plus two other amendments) no legal in-
terest or standing to sue was ever directly asserted 
as to the plaintiffs. Certainly in the some ten months 
from the filing of the original complaint to final dis-
missal of the "Second Amended Complaint" there 
was sufficient time and ample opportunity to set 
forth the nature of any such interest. There was fail-
ure to comply with the court's directive to be more 
specific in defining the nature of the claims and in-
terests of the plaintiffs. In addition, the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure were not followed in other par-
ticulars in that the complaints were not simple, 
direct, and concise, there was not shown any proper 
cause so as to justify repeated leave for amendments, 
and the amendments when filed failed to specify in 
a clear and comprehensible way the nature of any 
interest of the plaintiffs, the time period involved, 
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and other material essential to phrase a responsive 
rleading. In addition, the complaints were res judi-
cata as to the Plaintiff Tanner. 
With regard to the class action aspect of the 
complaints, it is submitted that such was properly 
a!smissed for several reasons. To begin with, a com-
mon class of persons with co-extensive interests was 
never adequately or properly defined. In addition, it 
affirmatively appears in the Record that plaintiffs 
, aonot currently belong to any defined class, and as to 
i the conglomerate "class" insisted upon, their claims · 
and interests are in fact antagonistic to other per-
sons within the same "class". In any event, the plain-
1
. tiffs do not adequately represent any class of persons, 
whether such be denominated as "true", "hybrid" or 
I ''spurious". 
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Thomas Greene 
of Marr, Wilkins & Cannon 
920 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
